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Having drawn up with American counterparts the rules and institutions of post-war international 
economy European nations, often acting in collabora-
tion, remain a dominant force in the multilateral trad-
ing system. For sure, European nations have pursued 
trade policies with foreign policy as well as commercial 
goals in mind and have signed bilateral trade agree-
ments in addition to multilateral accords; yet the fact 
remains that, acting together, the members of the Eu-
ropean Union1 were one of the two poles of the world 
trading system. However, in the last 10 years other na-
tions, in particular certain large developing countries, 
have contested these arrangements and arguably the 
bipolar world has given way to a multipolar alternative. 
This short essay examines some of the longer-term 
implications of a multipolar World Trade Organization 
(WTO) for European policymakers and explores what 
role the European Union might play in the multilateral 
trading system in the years to come. Along the way, I 
make a number of observations about the decline of 
the bipolar dominance of the world trading system, the 
factors likely to inﬂ uence the future commercial poli-
cies of the emerging trading powers, and the possi-
ble form that future multilateral trade initiatives might 
take. These observations may be of interest not just 
to those concerned about Europe’s place in the world 
but to those interested in the potential future trajectory 
of the multilateral trading system.
To me there are at least four important challenges to 
be faced when thinking through the implications of a 
multipolar world trading system. I will describe these 
challenges so as to better characterise the various ele-
ments of the required analysis. The ﬁ rst challenge is 
that the contours of this new world have not been pre-
cisely deﬁ ned. Even so, part (and maybe enough) of 
the landscape is coming into focus. Given their recent 
economic performance and the positions taken during 
the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, it 
seems that the identity of the new poles can be es-
tablished with some conﬁ dence. I shall take these new 
poles, or trading powers, to be China, India, and Bra-
zil. In what follows I argue that speciﬁ c aspects of their 
economic reform programmes, in particular the nature 
of business-state relations, as well as their very limited 
experience of liberalising in the context of reciprocal 
trade agreements, will shape the ends and means that 
these three nations pursue in the WTO over the me-
dium to longer term.
It is often said that the poles of the world trading 
system are supposed to provide its leadership. The 
second challenge, then, is that it is not immediately 
apparent what leadership means in this context.2 Does 
it mean the capacity of a WTO member to ensure that 
its proposals end up on this organisation’s agenda? 
Does it mean the ability to cajole other members into 
accepting a nation’s plans for the multilateral trading 
system, be that with respect to the future market open-
ing and liberalisation or the development of new rules 
for the world economy? Or does leadership include 
the capacity to successfully broker compromises and 
agreements among the diverse WTO membership? 
Does leadership include the capacity to encourage 
compliance by others with the WTO’s rules and prin-
ciples? Arguably, leadership in the WTO consists of all 
of these things and towards the end of this essay, after 
discussing the evolving multilateral trade landscape, 
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I will draw out a number of implications for the lead-
ership that Europe could offer the multilateral trading 
system in the years ahead.
A third challenge concerns the question “whose 
trade policy is the EU’s trade policy?” This question 
speaks not only to the institutional mechanisms that 
determine EU commercial policy, but also to the inter-
ests of European Union member states, corporations, 
unions, and other interested parties.3 Although I will 
not dwell on these factors as much, I note that the EU’s 
population and member states have in recent years 
been sharply divided over the case for further liberal-
ising their respective economies, in national, regional, 
and multilateral initiatives. (In the trade policy arenas 
this has manifested itself in a divergence of view on the 
merits of liberalising agriculture in the context of the 
Doha Round.4 Moreover, clear divisions between the 
member states have arisen concerning the use of so-
called trade defence instruments, namely, antidump-
ing, countervailing duties, and safeguard measures.5) 
Finally, EU member states have acted more aggres-
sively towards the European Commission, a point that 
I doubt is lost on the EU’s trading partners. There are 
certainly connections between these considerations 
and the rise of a multipolar world, not least because 
it is the very growth of certain emerging markets that 
some see as a threat to European living standards 
and this factor has conditioned trade policy of the EU. 
These arguments also beg the question as to whether 
the European Union has the trade policy-making pri-
orities and institutions it needs, a matter that is all the 
more poignant as 2007 marks the 50th anniversary of 
the signing of the Treaty of Rome.6
The ﬁ nal challenge concerns the WTO itself. At this 
stage the outcome of the Doha Round is unknown 
and, whatever the conclusion is, it could have impor-
tant implications for the attitudes taken by the current 
and future poles of the world trading system. Some 
observers in industrialised countries, for example, see 
the Doha Round as the last multilateral trade round, 
arguing that securing agreement takes too long or 
doubting that there is a basis for a reciprocal bargain 
that could form the foundation of a successful future 
multilateral trade round. Moreover, questions might 
well be asked of the WTO’s rule-making procedures 
and associated principles7 (including the consensus 
principle, the Single Undertaking, binding dispute set-
tlement, the principle of reciprocity, etc.) These institu-
tional factors and any changes therein will both be the 
result of decisions by WTO members and are likely to 
inﬂ uence the future role of trading powers in the WTO.
Inevitably, in such a short essay some selectivity 
is required. In what follows I will focus on the fall of 
the bipolar world trading system; the factors likely to 
shape the commercial policies of the three emerging 
trading powers, namely, Brazil, China, and India; and 
the implications for the commercial policy of the Euro-
pean Union and the possible shape of future multilat-
eral trade initiatives. Some concluding remarks follow. 
At most I hope that arguments developed here will en-
courage policymakers and analysts to reﬂ ect further 
on the four challenges described above and on what 
the shift towards multiple poles implies for the multilat-
eral trading system.
The Fall of the Bipolar World Trading System
From at least the negotiation of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the establishment 
of the WTO in 1995, the two dominant powers in the 
world trading system were the European Union (for-
mally the European Communities and its Member 
States) and the United States. When Pascal Lamy was 
the European Commissioner for Trade he described 
the situation thus:
“One classical piece of conventional wisdom on 
the WTO is that nothing happens in the WTO with-
out agreement between the US and the EU. Other 
countries stand aside, not always happily, until the 
elephants have fought it out and they are ‘invited’ to 
join the consensus. The other part of the conventional 
wisdom is that the US tends to lead the way, dragging 
with it an unwilling EU. This might have been true in 
earlier days of the GATT, but I do not believe it has 
been the case over the last few years”.8
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round which, in ad-
dition to cutting tariffs on merchandise trade further, 
brought agriculture, services, and intellectual prop-
erty rights into the ambit of international trade rules, 
3 An analogous question could be asked of the political economy of 
trade reform in each of the existing and emerging trading powers.
4 I documented those intra-EU differences on agricultural trade reform 
in Simon J. E v e n e t t : The WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong: 
What Next?, in: Journal of World Trade, Vol. 40, No. 2, April 2006.
5 Edwin Vermulst and I have documented the differences in view be-
tween member states concerning the efﬁ cacy of antidumping meas-
ures, see Simon J. E v e n e t t , Edwin Ve r m u l s t : The Politicisation of 
EC Anti-dumping Policy: Member States, Their Votes, and the Euro-
pean Commission, in: The World Economy,Vol. 28, No. 5, 2005.
6 Recently I have evaluated both the near-term trajectory and the 
longer-term strategy of EU commercial policy, see Simon J. E v e n -
e t t : “Global Europe”: An Initial Assessment of the European Commis-
sion’s New Trade Policy, in: Aussenwirtschaft, December 2006; Simon 
J. E v e n e t t : The Trade Strategy of the European Union: Time for a 
Rethink? Paper prepared for Breugel, April 2007.
7 I admit that much has been written on these matters, too much in 
fact to summarise here. One contribution in this respect is the Suth-
erland Report. See Peter S u t h e r l a n d , Jagdish B h a g w a t i , Kwesi 
B o t c h w e y, Niall F i t z g e r a l d , Koichi H a m a d a , John H. J a c k -
s o n , Celso L a f e r, Thierry d e  M o n t b r i a l : The Future Of The WTO. 
Addressing institutional challenges in the new millennium. Report by 
the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpa-
kdi, World Trade Organization; Geneva 2004. See also Robert Wo l f e , 
op. cit., for a recent insightful analysis of such matters.
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created a binding system of dispute settlement, and 
established the WTO, represented the high point in 
the inﬂ uence of the transatlantic powers on the world 
trading system. During the Uruguay Round, for the 
large part, the European Community and the United 
States set the multilateral trading system’s agenda, 
advanced their own interests, negotiated compromis-
es, and eventually secured the agreement of the GATT 
membership. For sure the Uruguay Round took a long 
time to negotiate, experienced a few “near death” ex-
periences along the way, and certainly involved the as-
sent of other nations, but still the broad thrust of this 
initiative was guided by the two leading powers.
Europe and America’s continued dominance of the 
world trading system was not to last. In just over 10 
years since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round their 
inﬂ uence has been vigorously contested and the WTO, 
the product of this transatlantic leadership, has suf-
fered a considerable reversal of fortune. With hindsight 
it is possible to identify a number of factors responsi-
ble for this turn of events. First, chronologically speak-
ing, were the doubts that many WTO members began 
to have in the mid-to-late 1990s about the efﬁ cacy 
of certain Uruguay Round agreements. Developing 
countries took aim in particular at the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs), arguing that it raised the cost of medicines in 
their countries without enhancing their availability. As 
this Agreement was seen by many industrialised coun-
tries as an important accomplishment of the Uruguay 
Round the battle lines were drawn and arguably the 
guerrilla war against the TRIPs agreement continues 
to this very day. Developing countries also called at-
tention to what they saw as heavy costs of implement-
ing the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and 
obligations entered into concerning customs reform. 
Despite the weak evidence offered in support of these 
claims, many developing country trade ofﬁ cials feared 
that the balance of costs and beneﬁ ts associated with 
the Uruguay Round trade agreements had shifted too 
far against them. Demands to address these concerns, 
including the potential renegotiation of certain agree-
ments, grew over time. The legacy of bipolar control 
of the world trading system looked increasingly tar-
nished.9
A second development was the determination of 
the European Commission and the United States to 
introduce proposals that would further expand the 
binding rules of the multilateral trading system, in par-
ticular as they relate to domestic regulatory policies. 
Both sought in the mid-to-late 1980s the inclusion of 
labour and environmental provisions in WTO agree-
ments. The European Commission also sought to ne-
gotiate multilateral disciplines on investment policy, 
competition law, transparency in government procure-
ment, and trade facilitation (the so-called Singapore 
Issues). Many developing countries saw potential la-
bour and environmental provisions as both directly 
undermining the cost competitiveness of their exports 
and providing a pretext for protectionist measures by 
industrialised countries and consequently vigorously 
opposed these provisions. One casualty of this op-
position was the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle, 
held in 1999, where the American chair got a taste of 
more of what was to come: robust opponents willing 
to block progress in a system based on the consensus 
principle. European objectives were to fare little better. 
At the Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2001 repre-
sentatives of the African Group of developing coun-
tries vetoed the formal launch of negotiations of the 
four Singapore Issues and the meeting collapsed soon 
thereafter. Also, a joint US-EU proposal on the modali-
ties for the agricultural trade negotiations was rejected 
as inadequate by a group of 20 or so developing coun-
tries led by Brazil and including China and India. The 
EU-US cartel over agenda setting and compromise 
brokering was over.
A third development at the Cancun Ministerial Con-
ference and afterwards was the formation of different 
groups of developing countries keen to inﬂ uence delib-
erations at the WTO. Care is needed here as develop-
ing countries have formed alliances before, including 
during the GATT era. Now, however, the scale and 
robustness of these groupings is of a different order. 
Some groupings have sought to aggressively cut the 
agricultural support paid by industrialised countries, 
others have argued to limit the reforms expected of 
their own agricultural sectors. Meanwhile other groups 
are oriented around regional, stage-of-development, 
and even product-related (e.g. cotton) concerns. Bro-
9 Sylvia O s t r y, op. cit., offered the following colourful evaluation of 
what developing countries actually obtained from the Uruguay Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations “The Grand Bargain turned out to be 
a Bum Deal” (page 3).
8 Pascal L a m y : Leadership, the EU and the WTO, speech given at 
the Evian Group, Montreux, Switzerland, 13 April 2002. Ostry char-
acterises the bipolar dominance slightly differently and arguably more 
completely than Lamy: “The GATT worked very well, effectively man-
aged from the 1960s by the European Community (now European 
Union or EU) and the US with a club of friends. No headlines for the 
General Agreement to Talk and Talk. The club model was based on a 
post-war consensus termed ‘embedded liberalism’: rules and other 
arrangements to buffer or interface between the international objec-
tive of sustained liberalisation through the reduction or elimination of 
border barriers and the objectives of domestic policy, sovereignty and 
stability. This largely transatlantic consensus was greatly aided by the 
use of reciprocity in negotiations (denounced as mercantilist by pur-
ists) and by the virtual exclusion of agriculture (via an American waiver 
and the near-sacrosanct European CAP or Common Agricultural Poli-
cy). Developing countries were largely ignored, although that began to 
change in the 1970s as a consequence of the OPEC oil shock”. Sylvia 
O s t r y : After Doha: Fearful New World?, in: Bridges, Year 10, No 5, 
August 2006, page 3 (italics in the original).
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kering compromises simultaneously among such a 
large number of groups became impossible and the 
obvious alternative – taking sequential steps towards 
compromise – ran into trouble as no individual WTO 
member or group was prepared to make concessions 
ﬁ rst, fearing that those concessions would be “pock-
eted” and the demands of trading partners ratcheted 
up higher. This proved to be a recipe for delays, stale-
mate, and endless missed deadlines.
Another innovation was that development-related 
considerations were supposed to be given particu-
lar attention during the Doha Round. The Ministerial 
Declaration launching the Doha Round is replete with 
development-related statements.10 If the emphasis 
on development concerns was the price that had to 
be paid by the European Commission and the USA 
to secure the launch of the Round in 2001, then that 
says something about the collective clout of develop-
ing countries and their capacity to inﬂ uence the WTO 
agenda-setting process. The fact that subsequent 
discussions, in particular as they relate to Special and 
Differential Treatment and Aid for Trade, have rarely 
moved beyond generalities to speciﬁ cs can be inter-
preted in a number of ways. It could imply that devel-
oping countries’ ability to inﬂ uence the WTO’s agenda 
does not carry over yet to securing agreement on ma-
jor items of interest to them. Alternatively, it could re-
ﬂ ect the fact that developing countries are divided 
on some development-related matters (for example, 
the efﬁ cacy of measures to address preference ero-
sion), or that they do not know what they really want 
in this respect (or cannot decide what they want until 
they see the other elements of a potential Doha Round 
agreement), or that they know what they want but do 
not want to specify their demands as of yet.11 Moreo-
ver, doubts have been expressed about the commit-
ment of certain industrialised countries, in particular 
the United States, to the development dimension of 
the Round.12 The latter point may be a reminder that 
the end of the bipolar world trading system does not 
mean the end of these two trading powers’ inﬂ uence.
It would be wrong to infer from this discussion that 
the decline of the bipolar world trading system was 
responsible for all of the trials and tribulations of the 
Doha Round. Nor does the foregoing discussion imply 
that the EU and the USA no longer remain central to 
10 The Doha Ministerial Declaration mentions the word “development” 
39 times, the phrase “technical assistance” 21 times, the phrase “ca-
pacity building” 13 times, and the expression “Special and Differential 
Treatment” 8 times.
11 It seems to me that many Least Developed Countries’ approach to 
the various forms of Special and Differential Treatment could well be 
examples of these last two possibilities.
12 For example, the Doha Development Agenda is almost always re-
ferred to as the Doha Round in Washington, DC trade circles. 
the destiny of the multilateral trading system. The lat-
ters’ economic size and extensive international trade 
and investment interests provide strong incentives to 
keep them engaged and underlie their still signiﬁ cant 
bargaining power. Even so, it is worth brieﬂ y noting the 
other central challenges faced during the Doha Round 
negotiations to date. These challenges may well be 
overcome in 2007 and, even if they are, a return to a 
bipolar world trading system seems highly unlikely.
A major obstacle experienced during the Doha 
Round negotiations is that, for various domestic po-
litical reasons in Europe, the United States, China, 
and India, to date it has been impossible to identify an 
overlap in the tolerable level of liberalising ambition. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the agricultural 
trade negotiations which have received prominent bill-
ing in this Round. Domestic considerations have forced 
the European Union, India, and China to limit conces-
sions on market access to their agricultural sectors, 
which is precisely the opposite of the reforms sought 
by the United States (and, earlier, by Brazil too.) Appar-
ently US trade negotiators feel they need aggressive 
foreign market opening for their farmers and ranchers 
if the latter are to be persuaded to accept reductions 
in domestic support payments (subsidies and associ-
ated payments) that America’s trading partners seek. 
Arguably, similar mismatches in ambition can be found 
in the current proposals to liberalise goods trade and 
national service sectors. In each case readily identiﬁ -
able, strong domestic constituencies have sought to 
constrain the freedom to make concessions by nation-
al trade negotiators, with some interest groups seeking 
to cap reforms while others demand minimum levels of 
liberalisation. In my view these constituencies in Eu-
rope and in the United States have effectively and con-
sistently outmanoeuvred supporters of trade reform 
and negotiators since the beginning of the Round. If 
such constituencies prevail and the Doha Round ir-
revocably collapses then there may well be questions 
about the extent and form of liberalisation that the 
WTO could possibly deliver in the medium term.
Another feature of the Doha Round has been the re-
luctance of trade negotiators to “pay” for other coun-
tries’ unilateral reforms. For example, few of the EU’s 
trading partners appear willing to give their European 
counterparts “negotiating credit” for implementing the 
unilateral reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy 
agreed to by EU Member States at the beginning of 
this decade. This unwillingness goes against two of 
the major tenets of WTO negotiations; namely, that it is 
bindings that matter and that the binding of previously 
undertaken unilateral reforms is of value. Perhaps cor-
porate interests view completed unilateral reforms as 
“history” and, more importantly, as almost certainly ir-
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reversible. In which case, those interests are unlikely 
to be impressed by commitments to bind unilateral re-
forms because it does not create any new commercial 
opportunities for them. In such circumstances corpo-
rate interests may well demand as a condition for their 
support of the multilateral trade round further actual 
liberalisation on the part of trading partners. Given the 
high level of bindings agreed in some sectors and by 
many developing countries in the Uruguay Round, this 
demand typically amounts to demanding very signiﬁ -
cant cuts in the relevant bindings by trading partners. 
Moreover, the levels of cuts necessary to create new 
commercial opportunities for corporate interests may 
not be consistent with any commitment to ensure 
comparable levels of cuts within a given class of WTO 
member, or indeed with a commitment that one group 
of WTO members (such as developing countries) 
makes less cuts on average than another group.
There are several related factors at work here: the 
signiﬁ cant number of unilateral reforms undertaken 
in some sectors and by many countries that has cre-
ated the gap between the bindings and the applied 
measures in the ﬁ rst place; the fact that it is cuts in 
applied measures and not bindings which create new 
commercial opportunities; agreements among WTO 
members to maintain comparable levels of ambition 
among countries at similar levels of development and 
to expect less ambition from the developing and least 
developed countries; and the apparently low levels of 
corporate support for completing the Doha Round. 
In sum, bindings may well be the legal “currency” at 
the WTO but, after nearly two decades of unilateral re-
forms in some WTO members, as currently formulated 
the proposed cuts in such bindings do not appear to 
elicit enough corporate support to overcome the op-
ponents to multilateral trade reform.13 If this diagnosis 
is correct then there may be signiﬁ cant ﬂ aws at the po-
litical economy core of the reciprocity-based multilat-
eral trading system.
To summarise, above I have marshalled arguments 
in support of the proposition that the bipolar domina-
tion of the world trading system by the European Un-
ion and the United States has ended. Moreover, I have 
argued that other countries have come forward and 
13 Another factor limiting corporate support is the lack of transparency 
and speciﬁ city concerning the exceptions that each WTO member 
can take with respect to liberalisation in each major area of trade. Un-
less and until these exceptions are speciﬁ ed openly, a major exporter 
is likely to discount any potential exports gains from completing the 
Doha Round by the likelihood that the product or products it ships 
are listed as an exception. Arguably, the difﬁ culties with bindings 
described in the main text and the uncertainty generated by lack of 
speciﬁ city on exceptions combine to limit the willingness of major ex-
porters to support the current round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
In general, more thought needs to be given to the effect of what might 
appear to be tedious technical negotiating modalities on the incen-
tives of major corporate groups to support multilateral trade liberalisa-
tion.
joined, rather than displaced, the EU and the United 
States. Finally, I have tried to put these arguments in 
perspective by pointing out other factors that have 
complicated the negotiation of the Doha Round, in-
cluding effective domestic interests that have made 
ﬁ nding a common level of liberalising ambition difﬁ -
cult and the complications that arise when negotiat-
ing trade agreements using bindings after an era of 
extensive unilateral reforms. These latter two factors 
raise questions about the political economy of the 
reciprocity-based negotiations at the WTO. Having 
said that, I return to the focus here on the multipolar 
trading system. Next I will consider the various fac-
tors likely to shape the commercial policy objectives 
of the potential new poles in the world trading system. 
That discussion, plus the observations made above, 
will provide the basis upon which to consider the pos-
sible implications for Europe’s longer-term commercial 
policy and associated strategy.
Factors underlying the Likely Future Commercial 
Policy Strategies of Brazil, China, and India
Which nations are likely to join the EU and the USA 
as leading trade powers? This question is difﬁ cult to 
answer with certainty, however, recent economic per-
formance and the proﬁ le adopted during the Doha 
Round of negotiations suggest, initially, three potential 
candidates namely, Brazil, China, and India. As the da-
ta reported in Table 1 indicates, in purchasing power 
parity terms, after 30 years of fast growth China now 
has an enormous economy, whose gross domestic 
product (GDP) is two-thirds that of the size of the US 
economy.14 Underlying China’s phenomenal economic 
growth has been an export boom that has seen it be-
come the third largest exporter of merchandise goods 
in the world (see Table 1). The ratio of total imports 
plus exports to GDP in China is just under 65 per cent, 
a level far higher than in the US, EU15, Brazil, and India. 
China’s growing clout has been recognised by its trad-
ing partners and, indeed, some have contended that 
fear of competitive Chinese exports has made some 
WTO members more reluctant to liberalise under the 
auspices of the Doha Round. Even if China’s growth 
rate were to halve over the decade to come then it 
would still be a sizeable economic power. Together, 
these matters justify further consideration of China as 
a potential pole of the world trading system.
In contrast the case in favour of Brazil and India’s 
emergence as poles is less clear cut. Brazil and India 
14 Using current exchange rates the relative size of China’s economy 
looks slightly less large. China’s economy recently overtook the Unit-
ed Kingdom’s in size, the latter being the fourth largest economy in 
the world. China is expected to overtake Germany, the third largest 
economy, soon. 
15 Please note that the data reported in Table 1 for the European Union 
excludes intra-EU trade.
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are the 15th and 20th largest exporters of merchandise 
goods in the world, respectively (see Table 1). Moreo-
ver, neither country’s trade-to-GDP ratio is exception-
ally high. Even so, both countries are regional powers 
and have been keen to raise their proﬁ le globally. Both 
countries have played a central role in the Doha Round 
negotiations and have built worldwide coalitions of 
WTO members, which is one important characteristic 
of leading trading powers. Their inclusion as potential 
poles is more of a reﬂ ection of this fact than because 
of their prior economic performance. Having said that, 
both countries (and India in particular) may in the fu-
ture become global economic powerhouses.
The requirements of a sizeable economy and over-
seas commercial interests and, as far as trade diplo-
macy is concerned, global ambition and reach are 
arguably what disqualiﬁ es many other regional trading 
powers from being possible poles of the world trading 
system, at least for the moment. For sure, both Rus-
sia and Turkey are important trading partners of the 
European Union. Yet neither country has a particularly 
large footprint in the world trading system (and let us 
not forget that Russia has still to accede to the WTO). 
South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt seem, at most, to 
be regional powers. Korea, despite its relatively large 
economy, has not asserted itself as much as India and 
Brazil in multilateral trade circles preferring, it seems, 
to focus its energies on negotiating free trade agree-
ments. Much of the same could be said about Mexico. 
Other regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, have a 
sizeable economic footprint but have not been partic-
ularly active in either bilateral or multilateral trade ne-
gotiations, at least as of now. For all of these reasons 
I focus my attention on just three new poles: Brazil, 
China, and India. In what follows I consider the impli-
cations of their current trading performance, develop-
ment strategies, and overseas corporate interests for 
their potential long-term strategies towards the world 
trading system. In the short space available I can 
hardly do justice to each of these nations’ rich and illu-
minating development experience. Instead I identify a 
number of common themes which may inﬂ uence their 
commercial policies in the years to come. Before do-
ing that, however, it is appropriate to dwell on the rela-
tive importance of the three new potential poles and 
the two existing poles (the EU and the USA)
In discussions of changing economic leadership, 
catching-up, and overtaking and the like it is sensi-
ble to keep some sense of proportion. Tables 1 and 2 
provide information that may be useful in this respect. 
Table 1 implies that, at present, the US and the EU to-
gether create (in purchasing power parity equivalent 
terms) nearly $25 trillion of value-added each year, 
nearly double the combined national outputs of Brazil, 
China, and India. Moreover, the EU and the US hold 
ﬁ rst or second place in the world as traders of both 
goods and services. The EU, for example, currently 
exports more in a month than India does in a year. The 
amount of trade per capita in both the EU and the US 
is seven times that of Brazil, and the comparable ra-
Table 1
Principal Trade-related Statistics of Current and 
Potential Poles of the World Trading System
Indicator Current poles of 
the world trading 
system
Potential poles of 
the world trading 
system
European 
Union1
United 
States
Brazil China India
Overall indicators
Population, million 459 296 186 1304 1095
GDP, US$ billion PPP 12097 12409 1627 8572 3816
Total merchandise exports2
US$ billion 
ranking in world3 
% world total
1320 
1 
17.12
904 
2 
8.67
118 
15 
1.13
762
 3 
7.30
95 
20 
0.91
Total merchandise imports 
US$ billion 
ranking in world 
% world total
 1461 
2 
18.03
1732 
1 
16.07
77 
19 
0.72
660
 3 
6.12
135 
11 
1.25
Total services exports
US$ billion 
ranking in world 
% world total
432 
1 
27.08
354 
2 
14.66
15 
21 
0.62
74 
4 
3.06
56 
6
 2.32
Total services imports
US$ billion 
ranking in world 
% world total
384 
1 
24.39
281 
2 
11.98
22 
17
0.95
83 
4 
3.54
52 
7 
2.22
Total trade, US$ billion 3597 3271 232 1579 338
Total trade/GDP, % 29.7 24.4 29.5 64.5 36.7
Total trade per capita, US$ 7837 9714 1018 962 236
Percentage of merchan-
dise exports shipped to EU 
and USA - - 42.4 40.3 38.0
Trade policy related indicators
Tariff binding coverage, % 100 100 100 100 73.8
Simple average applied 
tariff rate for agricultural 
goods, % 5.9 n.a. 10.3 15.9 15.4
Simple average applied 
tariff rate for non-agricul-
tural goods, % 4.0 3.3 12.7 9.1 37.6
MFN duty free imports, % 
of total imports 53.1 46.8 22.2 34.0 2.1
GATS services sectors with 
commitments 115 110 43 93 37
Membership of goods-
related (services-related) 
RTAs notiﬁ ed to WTO 23 (5) 9 (8) 4 (0) 4 (2) 5 (0)
1 The data reported here for the European Union refers to its ﬁ rst 25 
members. All extra-EU trade data is taken from the DG Trade website 
and refers to the year 2005.
2 All trade data reported here (exports and imports) excludes intra-EU 
trade.
3 All rankings take the EU as a single trading entity. 
S o u rc e : WTO Country Proﬁ les, obtained from http://stat.wto.org, 
unless otherwise speciﬁ ed. Data relates to latest year reported in 
source.
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tios are even higher for China and India. Clearly, the 
latter three countries still have a long way to go be-
fore they match the global economic footprint of the 
transatlantic trading powers. Some sense of how long 
is given in Table 2, which reports Goldman Sachs’ 
now-famous long term economic growth predictions 
for Brazil, China, and India.16 Without doubt the pre-
cise predictions of such models should not be taken 
too seriously. Nevertheless they can provide approxi-
mate information about the relative economic size 
of different nations. For instance, these projections 
suggest that almost 10 years from now Brazil, India, 
and China’s combined economic clout (as measured 
by their GDPs) will likely exceed the comparable total 
for the four largest EU economies (France, Germany, 
Italy, and the United Kingdom.)17 The current size of 
the US economy will prevent it from being overtaken 
for decades after that. In sum, then, it seems reason-
able to expect that Brazil, India, and China will con-
tinue to expand their shares of the world economy and 
will relatively soon have in aggregate roughly the same 
economic footprint as the European Union. This devel-
opment does not imply that the EU and the USA will 
cease to be signiﬁ cant forces in the world economy. 
Indeed, both seem certain to retain considerable inﬂ u-
ence in the world trading system. 
I now turn to the factors likely to shape Brazil, Chi-
na, and India’s external commercial policies in the 
decades ahead. In what is admittedly an ambitious 
undertaking, I shall emphasise certain economic and 
political factors which seem to be important in all three 
of these societies. I do not mean to suggest that these 
factors are equally important in each country or that 
other factors are unimportant. Instead, this kind of 
16 The original study by Goldman Sachs (Dominic W i l s o n , Roopa 
P u r u s h o t h a m a n : Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050, Gold-
man Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 99, 2003) included econo-
mic growth predictions for Russia as well and introduced the moniker 
for these four emerging markets of “BRICs”.
17 This particular Goldman Sachs study does not present growth pre-
dictions for the entire European Union, just these four countries.
forward-looking and inherently speculative exercise is 
fraught with enough risks that I would prefer to identify 
a few factors that I am relatively more conﬁ dent about 
than produce laundry lists of factors and caveats that 
the reader has a difﬁ cult time sorting through.
The ﬁ rst factor that is likely to be important is that 
all three economies have turned to external demand 
to stimulate economic growth (through exports) and 
are, therefore, relatively dependent on open markets 
abroad. Indeed, China has been sensitive in recent 
years to the amount of restructuring that its exports 
are causing its trading partners and is seeking to shift 
demand growth towards more domestic sources (in-
cluding consumption growth and growing demand 
for non-traded services). Table 1 reports that approxi-
mately 40 per cent of each of the new trading powers’ 
exports are shipped to the United States or to Europe; 
a percentage that, if current trends are to go by, is 
likely to increase. This ﬁ nding suggests, amongst oth-
ers, that the case could be made to Brazil, China, and 
India that they have a strong interest in ensuring that 
Western markets stay open and that currently WTO-le-
gal loopholes to close markets (namely, antidumping, 
countervailing duties, and safeguard measures) ought 
to receive further scrutiny. The preservation of market 
access, an important function of the WTO, should at 
a minimum be of interest to these emerging trading 
powers.
The second factor to take into account is that, de-
spite all of the trade reforms undertaken by Brazil, 
China, and India, to date there is still plenty of room 
for these countries to liberalise access to their markets 
further. Data reported in Table 1 indicates that the aver-
age applied rate of tariffs on agricultural and non-agri-
cultural goods is multiples of the comparable numbers 
for the US and EU. In addition, comparatively fewer 
products enter Brazil and especially India duty free. 
Moreover, with the possible exception of China (which 
went through the one-sided WTO accession process) 
there is plenty of room for these countries to expand 
Table 2
Projected GDPs of Leading National Economies 2000-2030 
(billons of 2003 US dollars)
Year Potential poles of the multilateral trading 
system
Current poles Total GDP of potential poles as a percentage 
of
Brazil China India Total 
(Brazil, 
China, India)
Total for four largest 
EU nations (France, 
Germany, Italy, UK)
Total for four largest EU 
nations plus the United 
States of America
Total for four largest 
EU nations (France, 
Germany, Italy, UK)
Total for four largest EU 
nations plus the United 
States of America
2000 762 1078 469 2309 5701 15526 40.5 14.9
2010 668 2998 929 4595 7047 20318 65.2 22.6
2020 1333 7070 2104 10507 8292 24707 126.7 42.5
2030 2789 14312 4935 22036 9284 30117 237.4 73.2
S o u rc e : Dominic W i l s o n , Roopa P u r u s h o t h a m a n : Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050, Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper 
No. 99, 2003.
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their commitments to open their service sectors to in-
ternational competition. The potential for trade reform, 
of course, does not imply an appetite for such reform. 
Indeed, a review of public statements made to na-
tional newspapers (and not to international audiences) 
by Chinese and Indian government ofﬁ cials during the 
second half of 2006 suggests little desire to liberalise 
agricultural import regimes or service sectors. India 
has also expressed concerns about liberalising goods 
trade further.
Notwithstanding developments in the last year or 
so, another similarity between Brazil, China, and India 
is just how relatively few free trade agreements they 
are members of (see Table 1). Perhaps more impor-
tantly, there is little or no evidence that any of these 
countries have been willing to substantially liberalise 
their economies within the context of reciprocal free 
trade agreements. China, for example, has to date 
signed FTAs that are conﬁ ned principally to freeing 
merchandise goods trade and these accords do not 
include many (if any) service sector commitments or 
provisions on regulatory measures that tend to be of 
interest to industrialised countries.18 If anything, In-
dia’s track record in FTA negotiations is worse. In ad-
dition to limiting the scope principally to goods trade, 
India has sought exceptions for literally hundreds of 
tariff lines (so much so that a number of its FTA nego-
tiations have stalled19 or been suspended because of 
these demands for exemptions.)20 Brazil’s FTA initia-
tives have tended to fall into two groups: those that 
18 The China-Chile FTA is a good example. This FTA contains no pro-
visions on service sector liberalisation or on national intellectual prop-
erty rights law. In fairness provisions on sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures are included in this FTA and appear to go beyond existing 
multilateral disciplines. With respect to the liberalisation of trade in 
goods in this FTA, China ensured that 211 tariff lines were excluded 
outright from liberalisation. In addition a total of 1610 product lines 
were given 10 year phase-in times for tariff elimination.
19 India sought to put 840 items on a sensitive list (down from an initial 
demand of 1400 items) in its FTA negotiations with ASEAN, and reject-
ed an ASEAN demand that India remove import duties on 90 per cent 
of its product lines by 2011. The ASEAN-Indian FTA negotiations were 
suspended soon after on 25 July 2006. Thailand faced similar chal-
lenges in its negotiations with India, with the latter seeking to impose 
very restrictive rules of origin that would have reduced the amount of 
goods able to enter India on a preferential tariff basis.
20 Defenders of India’s FTA strategy point to its FTA with Singapore, 
which includes measures to modestly liberalise India’s service sec-
tor. (Even here certain restrictions on the establishment of commercial 
presence through foreign direct investment have been retained by In-
dia.) It should be noted that this agreement also contains numerous 
exceptions to liberalising goods trade between the parties. A total of 
6551 tariff lines were excluded outright from tariff liberalisation. A fur-
ther 2407 tariff lines will only see a phased reduction of 50 per cent 
in the applied tariff rates. Together these exclusions and phased re-
ductions account for approximately 76 per cent of India’s tariff line 
commitments in its FTA with Singapore. In my view the latter indicates 
a distinct reluctance by India to commit to across-the-board goods 
trade liberalisation in the context of a reciprocal trade agreement with 
a nation whose economy is less than ﬁ ve per cent of the size of the 
Indian economy (when these economies are measured in purchasing 
power parity terms.) 
are concluded with Latin American neighbours where 
the implementation record has been poor (e.g. Merco-
sur) and those with non-Latin American trading part-
ners were the negotiations have not been completed 
(e.g. the EU-Mercosur negotiations.) 
The conclusion I draw from this experience is that all 
three countries have little or no experience of agreeing 
to and implementing extensive trade reforms within the 
context of reciprocally-negotiated international trade 
agreements. In this regard it is worthwhile recalling that 
before the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations devel-
oping country members of the GATT (which included 
Brazil and India) were not expected to liberalise during 
multilateral trade rounds. The Uruguay Round did call 
for reciprocal liberalisation, but as noted earlier, this 
agreement is not held in high regard by many devel-
oping countries, including Brazil and India.21 In short, 
Brazil, China, and India have little or no track record of 
engaging in reciprocal trade liberalisation and, since 
these three emerging trading powers are taking centre 
stage in the WTO, the degree of future support for the 
liberalisation function of the multilateral trading system 
must be called into question. Worse still, the impres-
sive growth of each of the three new trading powers’ 
exports since 2000 may further convince them that 
their overseas commercial interests can ﬂ ourish with-
out further reciprocal trade liberalisation.22
A fourth similarity concerns the use of industrial pol-
icy and the associated implications for business-gov-
ernment relations in Brazil, China, and India. As is well 
known, with the Washington Consensus moving out of 
favour with developing country policymakers, indus-
trial policy’s proﬁ le has risen. For better or for worse, 
desires not to leave corporate development entirely to 
the marketplace and to use large domestic markets to 
nurture national ﬁ rms probably also account for the at-
tention to industrial policy given by decision-makers in 
these three countries (and elsewhere for that matter).23 
As I argue below, what is also important is the impli-
cations of these policies for how states perceive the 
performance of “their” ﬁ rms abroad for their offensive 
commercial policy agendas.
21 Both of these nations have called for certain Uruguay Round trade 
agreements to be renegotiated.
22 According to WTO statistics Brazil, India, and China each saw their 
combined exports of goods and services grow on average (in nominal 
terms) by at least 20 per cent per annum since 2000.
23 The reader should not interpret the following emphasis on China 
and India’s industrial policies and the extensive nature of their busi-
ness-government linkages as suggesting that these countries’ circum-
stances are particularly egregious or unique. The resurgence in recent 
years of policies towards national champions from certain European 
governments, including for example its manifestation as “economic 
patriotism” in France, demonstrate that the new trading powers are 
not alone in their pursuit of industrial policies and the like.
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China, for one, adopted a policy in the 1990s of de-
veloping a so-called National Team of ﬁ rms capable 
of competing in world markets.24 According to Suth-
erland25, 113 of China’s 2692 industrial groups were 
selected for special treatment and have strong links to 
China’s State Council, the most senior governmental 
decision-making body. A Vice-Premier of China, Wu 
Bangguo, once rationalised this policy in the following 
terms:
“In reality, international economic confrontations 
show that if a country has several large companies or 
groups it will be assured of maintaining a certain mar-
ket share and a position in the international economic 
order. America, for example, relies on General Motors, 
Boeing, Du Pont, and a batch of other multinational 
companies. Japan relies on six large enterprise groups 
and Korea relies on 10 large commercial groupings. In 
the same way now and in the next century our nation’s 
position in international economic order will be to a 
large extent determined by the position of our nation’s 
large enterprises and groups.”26
“If we use our strong large-scale enterprises and 
groups and they all ﬁ ght alone, everyone will still ﬁ nd 
it difﬁ cult in the ever intensifying domestic and inter-
national competition to compete on equal terms with 
large international companies. We must therefore unite 
and rise together, develop economies of scale and 
scope and nurture a ‘national team’ capable of enter-
ing the world’s top 500.”27
It is doubtful whether, having nurtured these large 
ﬁ rms and encouraged them to cultivate links with the 
highest reaches of central government, that Chinese 
ofﬁ cials will be prepared to let them fail in foreign 
markets or have their overseas strategies thwarted 
without some form of intervention on the ﬁ rm’s be-
half.28 
Matters are slightly different, however, in India. In 
a pair of penetrating articles published in 2006 Kohli 
describes how a pro-business, rather than a pro-
market, strategy guided both business-government 
relations in India and the course of economic reforms 
24 For details see Peter N o l a n : China and the global business revolu-
tion, Palgrave 2001.
25 Dylan S u t h e r l a n d : China’s Large Enterprises and the Challenge 
of Late Industrialisation, Routledge 2003.
26 Peter N o l a n , op. cit., p. 71.
27 Peter N o l a n , op. cit., p. 81.
28 For a recent analysis of the corporate performance of the Chinese 
National Team see Paul G u e s t , Dylan S u t h e r l a n d : How Has Chi-
na’s ‘National Team’ Of Enterprise Groups Performed? An Evaluation 
Using Aggregate and Firm Level Data, Centre for Business Research, 
University of Cambridge, Working Paper, 2006.
in recent years.29 In his concluding observations Kohli 
notes:
“The evidence is more consistent with the view that 
the development model pursued in India since about 
1980 is a pro-business model that rests on a fairly 
narrow ruling alliance of the political and economic 
elite.”30
Kohli contends that an inﬂ uential group of Indian 
businesspeople agreed that the state should take 
measures to facilitate export expansion. Indeed so in-
ﬂ uential was this group in the early 1990s, at the time 
of India’s reforms, that it was referred to as the “junior 
partner” of government on account of its close ties to 
the Indian civil service.31 Even so, the elaborate steps 
taken by the Chinese government to promote its Na-
tional Team (as documented by Nolan) appear to have 
gone far beyond those taken by Indian counterparts 
towards their own private sector ﬁ rms (at least as doc-
umented by Kohli). 
Two developments in the past year suggest a differ-
ent form of Indian state intervention on behalf of “its” 
ﬁ rms, in particular when those ﬁ rms encounter difﬁ -
culties abroad. The ﬁ rst development concerned the 
hostile takeover by Mittal Steel (a London-based but 
Indian-run company) of Arcelor, a Continental Euro-
pean steel company partly owned by France, Luxem-
bourg, and Spain. This takeover met with considerable 
criticism from politicians in Luxembourg and France, 
raising the prospect of overt or covert discrimination 
against the bidder. So concerned was the Government 
of India about Arcelor’s treatment that its Prime Minis-
ter is reported to have raised the matter in person with 
the French President, surely the ﬁ rst time the holders 
of such ofﬁ ces have discussed a corporate takeover.32 
During the dispute it is worth noting what Indian Com-
merce Minister, Mr. Nath, had to say about this matter, 
as reported in the Financial Times:
“This is an era of globalisation, cross-border invest-
ment and liberalisation, not one in which investors are 
judged by the colour of their skin in breach of . . . na-
tional treatment rules. If the colour of the shareholder, 
the nationality of the shareholder, or the passport of 
the shareholder is to be looked at, then we will have to 
give new deﬁ nitions to national treatment.” 
29 Atul K o h l i : Politics of Economic Growth in India, 1980-2005. Part 
I: The 1980s, in: Economic and Political Weekly, 1 April 2006; Atul 
K o h l i : Politics of Economic Growth in India, 1980-2005. Part II: The 
1990s and Beyond, in: Economic and Political Weekly, 8 April 2006. 
30 Atul K o h l i : Politics of Economic Growth in India, 1980-2005. Part 
II: The 1990s and Beyond, op. cit., p. 1368.
31 Ibid., p. 1362.
32 See “India asks Chirac to be fair to Mittal,” in: Financial Times, 21 
February 2006.
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Advising protectionist EU countries to take account 
of the rise of India and China as economic powers, Mr. 
Nath said governments should allow shareholders to 
determine the bid’s outcome. “Countries must wake 
up to the new economic architecture,” Mr. Nath said. 
“The Indian government is very concerned. I raised 
this with Peter Mandelson (EU trade commissioner) on 
February 1 and will raise it again.” 
“Mr Nath’s intervention reﬂ ects growing concern in 
India that non-tariff barriers are being erected in Eu-
rope and the US that will slow its emergence as a glo-
bal economic powerhouse.”33 
The second development concerns the reaction in 
India to Tata’s very recent takeover of Anglo-Dutch 
steel group, Corus. The jubilation expressed in India at 
this corporate deal strongly suggests that many iden-
tify Indian well-being with the performance of its multi-
national ﬁ rms and raises questions as to whether New 
Delhi could withstand entreaties by Indian multination-
als to intervene abroad on their behalf.
Industrial policy in Brazil does not appear to have 
taken on the same virulent forms as in India and China. 
Government measures to bolster exports, in particular 
to diversify exports (away from agriculture and raw ma-
terials) have been taken. Arguably, Brazil has defend-
ed internationally its industrial policy interests before, 
as the long-running Bombardier-Embraer dispute with 
Canada demonstrated.34 Moreover, India and Brazil 
have made joint submissions to the WTO membership 
to relax certain multilateral rules on trade-related in-
vestment measures. Yet, these steps appear to be the 
exception rather than the rule. Overall, then, for two 
of the new emerging trading powers there appears to 
be a strong nationalistic link between their multination-
als’ performance and perceived state interest which, 
in turn, may well inﬂ uence their external commercial 
policies.
What light can the available facts on multinationals’ 
activity shed on the strength of Brazil, China, and In-
dia’s likely interest in the overseas performance of their 
national ﬁ rms? Table 3, which was compiled from Unit-
ed Nations sources, provides some information that 
may be useful in this regard. The ﬁ rst potentially sig-
niﬁ cant ﬁ nding is that, together, these three countries 
have over 6,000 multinational corporations operating 
33 “Racism alleged over Mittal’s Arcelor bid – New Delhi criticises 
European governments opposed to Euros 18.6bn move for Luxem-
bourg-based group,” in: Financial Times, 11 February 2006. 
34 For an account of this dispute and the associated government poli-
cies see Andrea E. G o l d s t e i n , Steven M. M c G u i re : The Political 
Economy of Strategic Trade Policy and the Brazil-Canada Export Sub-
sidies Saga, in: The World Economy, Vol. 27, No. 4, April 2004.
overseas already.35 Nearly 5,000 of these corporations 
are Chinese and Indian. Moreover, in the latest year for 
which data was available, China has nearly as many 
multinational companies operating overseas (3429)36 
as the United States (3857). (This is not to say, though, 
that Chinese multinationals are on average the same 
size as their American counterparts.)
The second ﬁ nding in Table 3 is that almost all of 
Brazil, China, and India’s outward foreign direct in-
vestment is in the form of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions, making the manner in which these ﬁ rms 
are treated by foreign governments, regulators, and 
politicians a recurring potential concern for the three 
governments. Firms from Brazil, China, and India pur-
chased or merged with a total of 490 foreign ﬁ rms dur-
ing the years 2003-2005. Overall, the total overseas 
stock of foreign direct investments held by these three 
countries rose from $82 billion in 2000 to $128 billion in 
2005. While this represents a substantial expansion in 
the overseas footprint of Brazilian, Chinese, and Indian 
ﬁ rms, the data presented in Table 3 also indicates how 
small (relatively speaking) these sums are compared 
to the existing operations of US and EU multinationals. 
However, for my purposes what matters is not whether 
parity in multinational activity between the new trading 
powers and the US and EU has been achieved, but 
when overseas multinational activity becomes sufﬁ -
ciently large so that it begins to markedly inﬂ uence the 
trade policies of Brazil, India, and China. As the raw 
nerves sparked in India by the Mittal-Arcelor takeo-
ver can attest, that point may well have already been 
reached. Further expansion of multinational activities 
by these three nations’ companies is likely to reinforce 
the priority given to defending the overseas corporate 
interests of “own” ﬁ rms.
The purpose of the above was, ﬁ rst, to identify three 
potential new poles in the world trading system and to 
justify their choice and the exclusion of other candi-
date countries. Essentially, the combination of actual 
economic clout (or the serious likelihood thereof) and 
the development of a global proﬁ le in the multilateral 
trade arena (in particular during the Doha Round) were 
the selection criteria. The discussion then proceeded 
to identify four shared characteristics of these emerg-
ing trading powers, namely, a high dependence on 
Western export markets, overseas investments and 
35 This count is likely to be an underestimate as it refers to the number 
of parent companies that are based in a given economy and so ex-
cludes multinational companies perceived to be “ours” even though 
they are based abroad. Therefore, India’s count would not include the 
Mittal Steel Company, whose headquarters is based in Europe.
36 This statistic does not include the 948 multinationals based in Hong 
Kong, China. Whether the Chinese government feels the same degree 
of afﬁ nity for Hong Kong-based multinationals as it probably does for 
mainland Chinese counterparts is another matter and worth consider-
ing further.
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corporate activity, industrial policies, and business-
government relations that could very well shape their 
external commercial policies in the years to come, with 
potential implications for each of these countries’ role 
in the world trading system. In the next part the impli-
cations of the foregoing observations for the European 
Union’s trade policy and its place in the WTO as well 
as for the possible form of future multilateral initiatives 
will be discussed.
The European Union’s Commercial Policy in a 
Multipolar Trading System
A number of internal and external factors are likely 
to inﬂ uence the role that the European Union is likely 
to play in the world trading system over the medium to 
longer term, and not all of them are related to the rise 
of a multipolar WTO. Addressing the EU’s likely role 
is quite a different matter from considering the role it 
should play and my focus here is on what those exter-
nal and internal factors imply for what the EU is likely 
to do. I discuss a number of such factors in turn.
In recent years and for a variety of reasons many 
European voters have tended to side with those in-
terest groups opposed to further economic reforms. 
There is, for sure, variation across Europe in the sup-
port for trade and other forms of economic reform.37 
This opposition has manifested itself in the paring 
back of a European Commission initiative to liberalise 
the service sector (the so-called Bolkestein Directive), 
in the watering down of an important takeover direc-
tive, in the belief that insufﬁ cient attention was given to 
“social” provisions in the draft European Constitution 
(which contributed considerably to the eventual de-
feats of referenda to ratify the proposed Constitution 
in France and in the Netherlands), and in widespread 
37 See German Marshall Fund: Perspectives on Trade and Poverty 
Reduction. A Survey of Public Opinion, Key Findings Report 2006, 
Washington, DC 2006, for a recent survey of European and US public 
opinion on globalisation, economic reform, and related matters.
resistance to liberalising the Common Agricultural 
Policy. Fears about the effects of import competition 
from emerging markets, from East Asian nations in 
particular, have been expressed. All of these consid-
erations are likely to raise doubts as to the extent to 
which the European Union can liberalise substantially 
further within the context of reciprocal trade agree-
ments. The opposition to reform may well change over 
time, in particular if economic growth in Europe rises 
and there is a sustained reduction in the numbers of 
unemployed. 
European political pressures to resist, or limit, se-
rious liberalisation in the context of reciprocal trade 
agreements, mirroring similar earlier remarks about 
India and China, have a number of implications for 
European Union commercial policy. First, it must call 
into question what can seriously be accomplished in 
bilateral FTAs between the European Union and the 
new poles of the world trading system. The EU’s eco-
nomic footprint is still too big to avoid demands from 
trading partners that it reform, demands that it would 
be (on the basis of recent debates within Europe) hard 
pressed to meet in agriculture and in services. Interest-
ingly, the European Commission is about to launch FTA 
negotiations with India. Realistically, the prospects of 
the latter amounting to much are limited, especially as 
neither party to the negotiation has prepared their re-
spective publics for any of the reforms that might come 
with this initiative.38 Moreover, if the public statements 
of Indian ministers are anything to go by, then the In-
dian government has already successfully painted the 
European Union as the demandeur in this negotiation. 
Finally, both parties appear to have very different ideas 
about the desirable timetable for the talks (with the 
Europeans wanting a shorter timetable for the conclu-
sion of the negotiations and the Indians indicating a 
38 For example, have EU ofﬁ cials made the case for allowing more 
temporary workers into Europe, which is almost certain to be a key 
demand of the Indian government?
Table 3
Various Indicators of the Extent and Nature of Overseas Investments
Country Number of 
own
Multinationals1
FDI outﬂ ow 
(total 2003-
2005), value2
Cross-border M&A 
purchases (total 
2003-2005), value3
Cross-border M&A 
purchases (total 
2003-2005), number4
Total stock of 
outward FDI, 
20005
Total stock of 
outward FDI, 
20056
Brazil 1225 12.6 16.0 88 52 72
China 3429 13.1 8.0 190 28 46
India 1493 4.9 4.7 212 2 10
Total (potential poles) 6147 30.6 28.7 490 82 128
European Union member states 39018 1176 673 6259 3050 5475
United States 3857 351 340 3776 1316 2051
Total (current poles) 42875 1527 1013 10035 4366 7526
S o u rc e : United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: World Investment Report. FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: 
Impications for Development, New York and Geneva 2006.  1 Annex table A.I.6., number of parent corporations, latest year available.  2 Annex 
table B.1., billions of US dollars.  3 Annex table B.4., billions of US dollars.  4 Annex table B.5., number of deals.  5 Annex table B.2, billions of US 
dollars.  6 Annex table B.2., billions of US dollars.
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preference for a more relaxed posture). A substantial 
amount of optimism is needed to overcome the gloom 
raised by these considerations.
With respect to an FTA with China, the European 
Commission recently ruled this out, presumably be-
cause it would scare too many horses in Europe. 
China’s economic prowess, especially as it relates to 
exports, may now make it “too big” for the Europe-
an Union to negotiate an FTA with, unless there is a 
marked increase in European self-conﬁ dence. Indeed, 
so long as fears about the rising of emerging mar-
kets persist in Europe, India and Brazil may too ﬁ nd 
that their aspirations for economic growth are a dou-
ble-edged sword in their dealings with the European 
Union. On the one hand, a larger market may make 
the EU keener to negotiate an FTA with them. On the 
other hand, if greater economic size has come about 
through exports then European fears about the impact 
of import competition may block a negotiation from 
starting or from being successfully concluded. Plus, 
EU policymakers will take into account that the larger 
the trading partner the more likely politically painful 
demands will be made of the EU during any FTA nego-
tiation. If the latter considerations dominate, then the 
window of opportunity for Brazil and India to sign FTAs 
with the EU may be short-lived.
The second implication is that, given the limited 
prospects for successful EU bilateral trade initiatives 
with Brazil, China, and India, whether the EU likes it or 
not, all roads lead back to the WTO. However, the very 
difﬁ culties that the EU, China, and India, in particular, 
may have in making substantial reforms in the context 
of reciprocal trade agreements, suggest that the mar-
ket-opening role of the WTO is likely to be demoted in 
the years to come.39 Instead, the EU may ﬁ nd common 
ground with the new trading powers in the develop-
ment of certain rules that protect their respective over-
seas commercial interests. To see why recall that the 
new trading powers are heavily dependent on access 
to the EU and US markets for their exports and could, 
therefore, be willing to support measures that constrain 
the use of trade defence instruments.40 Moreover, the 
39 Another reason for doubting a market access agenda will gain 
broad-based support is that the OECD nations’ merchandise trade is 
almost open and that the remaining market access interests of the 
new trading powers (including agriculture and national labour markets, 
the latter through the movement of national persons) remain politically 
sensitive matters in the USA and the EU. 
40 A contrary argument is that in recent years China and India have 
increasingly sought recourse to antidumping investigations to protect 
their domestic ﬁ rms. During the period 2000-June 2006 China and In-
dia initiated 125 and 316 antidumping investigations respectively. The 
comparable numbers for the EU and the US were 159 and 232 respec-
tively. (Some have argued, however, that with all concerned targeting 
each others’ exports then the case for stronger multilateral disciplines 
on antidumping measures may become more attractive. There may be 
something to this argument, however, on the basis of prior experience 
it seems to me to be yet another triumph of hope over experience.)
concerns of China and India with respect to the over-
seas operations of their multinationals may lead them 
to seek new and stronger rules on non-discrimination 
(on national treatment in particular) in a number of the 
regulatory arenas that their ﬁ rms operate in. 
Given that Europe has a very large number of mul-
tinationals of its own and seeks to secure a greater 
share of commerce in emerging markets, a rules-based 
agenda for the WTO may be more appealing than mar-
ket access-improving initiatives. No one should be 
under any doubt, however, about the opposition to 
such an agenda, which would likely have a number of 
sources. Nationalistic sentiments may well be aroused 
by an agenda to reform national regulatory policies. 
Furthermore, if history is anything to go by, the United 
States for one is likely to vigorously oppose any tight-
ening of rules on trade defence instruments. Moreover, 
a shift away from the market-opening role of the WTO 
towards rules development is, at ﬁ rst, unlikely to excite 
US corporate interests (including its inﬂ uential agricul-
tural interests), although presumably the case could 
be made that US multinational corporations would 
gain. Brazil too may resent foregoing its ambitions to 
liberalise agricultural trade. These considerations sug-
gest that there is a risk of no coincidence of wants 
emerging among the ﬁ ve likely future trading powers, 
with three powers probably disinclined to pursue mar-
ket opening and two wanting such liberalisation. At 
this stage, however, perhaps the main point to stress 
is that a multilateral negotiation based principally on 
rules may well deserve a closer look, especially if the 
Chinese and Indian governments continue to identify 
closely with the overseas performance of their multi-
nationals. On this logic rules strengthening and wid-
ening the application of national treatment disciplines 
could provide one foundation for future multilateral 
trade accords.41
The third implication concerns the nature of any 
future EU leadership at the WTO. Perhaps the right 
place to start is to reiterate that even though Europe’s 
economy may be slow growing its very size will ensure 
that it can take a leadership role, should it wish to. For 
sure, it will be shared leadership. What the EU will have 
to get used to, however, is a diminution of its power 
as an agenda setter and as a compromise broker, and 
its ability to single-handedly advance its interests. The 
EU will likely retain an effective veto on measures that 
it does not like and can play a strong role in ensuring 
that WTO rules are adhered to by others and, perhaps 
41 Bernard Hoekman reminded me that international cooperation on 
such matters need not take place within the conﬁ nes of binding mul-
tilateral agreements and that alternatives, including soft-law alterna-
tives, could be considered. Pointing to the latter logical possibility is 
perfectly proper and, in turn, raises the question of the relative effec-
tiveness of potential future binding and non-binding initiatives. 
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more importantly for credibility-related purposes, by 
itself. Coalition formation will become more important 
and above I have attempted to identify certain poten-
tial commonalities of interest between the EU and the 
new trading powers.
It should be stressed, however, that certain key pa-
rameters may well change over the years to come, 
which may alter how the EU pursues its interests at 
the WTO. The current proliferation of FTAs may have 
two consequences in this regard. First, Brazil, China, 
and India may, as a result of signing FTAs, become 
more comfortable about liberalising markets in the 
context of reciprocal trade agreements; a process that 
could well take some time given these countries’ track 
records to date. Second, the proliferation of RTAs may 
result in growing demands to develop multilateral rules 
to offset the discriminatory effects of FTA provisions.42 
Alternatively, there may be sufﬁ cient convergence in 
the language of certain provisions that their codiﬁ ca-
tion into multilateral trade agreements may well be 
less challenging than appears at present. In my view 
much depends on the speciﬁ cs of the latter provisions 
and their overall commercial signiﬁ cance.
Another important parameter is the reaction among 
principally Western electorates to further international 
market integration. In addition to the woes expressed 
in Europe, in the United States over the past 12 months 
there has been a remarkable amount of hand-wring-
ing by the centre-left supporters of globalisation about 
its consequences for what is often referred to as the 
economic security of the middle classes and for wage 
stagnation.43 Just how much open borders are really 
responsible for these developments can be debated, 
but should the mood towards economic reform and 
openness sour further on both sides of the Atlantic, 
then EU trade policy may take on an even more defen-
sive posture. This could involve deterring protection-
ist measures at home as well as abroad and trying to 
conserve the WTO rules that already exist. Taken to-
gether, these arguments highlight the variety of factors 
likely to inﬂ uence EU trade policymaking in the coming 
decade or so.
42 Richard E. B a l d w i n : Multilaterising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls 
as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade, in: The World 
Economy, Vol. 29, No. 11, November 2006.
43 See, for example, the op-ed piece by Lawrence Summers titled 
“Only fairness will assuage the anxious middle,” published in The Fi-
nancial Times on 11 December 2006. Arguably concerns about the 
wellbeing of the middle classes played a role in the mid-term Con-
gressional elections in November 2006, which saw a large number 
of trade sceptics elected (see Simon J. E v e n e t t , Michael M e i e r : 
The U.S. Congressional Elections in 2006: What Implications for U.S. 
Trade Policy?,  14 November 2006, mimeo). Finally, see press reports 
of, and recent testimony given at, a Hearing on Trade and Globaliza-
tion held by the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee on 30 Janu-
ary 2007.
Concluding Remarks
The shift from a bipolar to a multipolar trading sys-
tem certainly marks a diminution in the clout of the Eu-
ropean Union along a number of dimensions and calls 
for a review of the ends and means of its commercial 
policy. The emergence of three more trading powers 
was considered at some length in this paper because 
it is likely to condition trade policymaking in Europe 
and elsewhere. European ofﬁ cials may ﬁ nd that sign-
ing free trade agreements with these three emerging 
trade powers (Brazil, China, and India) is a lot less sat-
isfying than they currently think; with the implication 
that all roads probably lead back to the WTO in Ge-
neva, irrespective of the detours taken en route. 
Turning to the potential content of future multilat-
eral initiatives it was argued that a sizeable constitu-
ency for the further development of certain multilateral 
rules, in particular those to limit discrimination against 
corporations operating inside foreign borders, may 
well develop and arguably this would be in the Euro-
pean Union’s interest. Strengthening and widening 
the application of national treatment principles could 
on this logic receive much more attention. In contrast, 
the priority given to using WTO agreements to open 
markets could diminish precisely because Brazil, In-
dia, and China have little experience to date in under-
taking signiﬁ cant commercial reforms in the context 
of reciprocal trade agreements and are experiencing 
considerable export growth with their existing access 
to the markets of the industrialised world. The latter 
attitude may well change over time44, as might public 
attitudes towards international market integration in 
Europe and the United States, both of which may relax 
the constraints facing European trade policymakers in 
a multipolar world trading system. 
All of these considerations point to a potentially 
different mix of obligations in future multilateral trade 
accords and highlight the need for further careful con-
sideration of where the common ground actually lies 
between the key players in a multipolar world trading 
system. In particular, such consideration will require 
greater understanding abroad of the important do-
mestic political factors, policy formation processes, 
and socio-economic and industrial development strat-
egies of the new poles of the world trading system.
44 In an email to me Robert Wolfe took this point and developed it in 
a different way. The challenge as Wolfe sees it is to understand how 
reciprocal trade liberalisation could be internalised in the policy mak-
ing processes of the new trading powers so as to give fresh impetus 
to the liberalisation function of the WTO. My emphasis, of course, has 
been on the potential for rule development – in particular, strengthen-
ing and widening disciplines on national treatment. Rule development 
can complement liberalisation, but I would argue that the former could 
go forward on its own (just, as in principle, the latter can). 
